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Abstract 
This paper describes a default reasoning problem, analogous to the frame problem, that arises 
when an attempt is made to construct a logic-based calculus for reasoning about the movement of 
objects in a real-valued co-ordinate system. A number of potential solutions to this problem are 
examined. Particular attention is given to the interaction between the default reasoning required 
by these solutions and that required to overcome the frame problem, especially when the latter 
demands an “existence of situations” axiom. 
1. Intruduction 
Much commonsense r asoning about the everyday world concerns the spatial prop- 
erties of objects-their shapes and locations-and how these properties change over 
time. Accordingly, if we are to develop a formal theory of commonsense, we need a 
precisely defined language for talking about shape, spatial location and change. The 
theory will include axioms, expressed in that language, that capture domain-independent 
truths about shape, location and change, and will also incorporate a formal account of 
any non-deductive forms of commonsense inference that arise in reasoning about the 
spatial properties of objects and how they vary over time. 
This paper combines the situation calculus of McCarthy and Hayes [ 151 with a formal 
language for talking about shape similar to that of Davis [ 41. When this language is 
used to describe the effects of simple move actions, a problem arises which, like the 
frame problem, appears to demand some form of default reasoning. It is an obvious 
precondition of any action that changes an object’s location that the object’s destination 
must be unoccupied. With the Blocks World, in which similar preconditions are required, 
this is not a source of trouble. But space in the Blocks World is normally represented 
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simply as a small set of locations. In the kind of more sophisticated language required 
for a proper treatment of shape, space has to be represented via a real-valued co-ordinate 
system. 
With space represented in this way, it becomes difficult to describe a situation com- 
pletely with respect to which regions of space are occupied and which are empty. With 
only an incomplete description of spatial occupancy, it is impossible to prove that the 
preconditions for moving an object hold in a situation, because those regions which 
are unoccupied are not explicitly specified. To overcome this, we would like to be able 
to capture the commonsense law that space is normally empty. This paper attempts to 
formalise such a commonsense law. 
The incorporation of multiple laws of commonsense into a theory must be done 
with great care if they are to interact properly. In this case, we must ensure that the 
commonsense law that “space is normally empty” operates correctly in the presence 
of the commonsense law that “actions normally don’t affect fluents”. One of the most 
successful attempts to overcome the frame problem, in other words to formalise the 
second of these laws, is state-based minimisation [ 21. This approach is adopted in this 
paper because it copes so well with domain constraints. But one of the features of 
state-based minimisation is its demand for a so-called “existence of situations” axiom. 
This axiom guarantees that a situation exists for every legitimate combination of fluents. 
It is the presence of this axiom which makes the formalisation of the first of these laws 
difficult. 
2. Space and shape 
To see how the need arises for a commonsense law that space is normally empty, 
we first need a language for talking about space and shape. The problem of defining 
a formal language for talking about change has received plenty of attention in the 
knowledge representation literature, and a variety of choices with collections of relevant 
axioms (see, for example, [ 151, [ 161, [ 11, [8], [lo]). The task of defining a formal, 
logic-based language for talking about shape and spatial location has been given less 
attention, notable exceptions being the work of Hayes [ 81, Shoham [ 221, Davis [ 41, 
[ 5, Chapter 61, Kaufman [9], and Randell et al. [ 191. 
The language of this paper is a language of many-sorted first-order predicate calculus 
with equality. I will begin by introducing space, regions and points. I will assume that 
space is two-dimensional and corresponds to the set S = W x R, where R is the set of 
reals. A region is a subset of S, and a point is a member of S. Accordingly, the language 
includes sorts for regions and points, with variables r, r-0, rl , r-2,. . ., and p,po,p~ , ~2,. . ., 
respectively. Note that regions do not have to be connected. An example of an object 
occupying a non-continuous region would be a mist comprising a number of separate 
particles. I will consider only interpretations in which points are interpreted as pairs of 
reals, in which regions are interpreted as sets of points, and in which the E predicate 
and the comparative predicates <, <, >, 3 all have their usual meanings. 
A convenient way to represent a shape is as a region. I will assume that every shape 
has a conventional reference point, which is the origin (0,O). For regular shapes, it is 
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convenient o make this reference point the shape’s centre. For example, a circle of 
radius d units could be defined using the following sentence (Ex 1) . t The distance sort 
is introduced here, which has variables d, do, dl , d2, . . ., and which is interpreted by R. It 
is assumed for this example that the language includes the function Disc being defined, 
which maps a distance onto a region, and the function Distance, which is defined to 
map two points onto the distance between them. Neither of these functions is part of 
the basic language, though Distance would be useful for many other examples. 2 
p E Disc(d) H Distunce(p, (0,O)) < d. @xl) 
Much more complicated shapes than this can be described using this simple language, 
but this is not the concern of the present paper. Space is occupied by objects. Each object 
has a unique shape. I will assume that an object’s shape is fixed over time, but it would 
be easy to extend the language to allow objects with changing shapes. The sort for 
objects has variables ob, obo, obl, obp, . . . . The shape of an object is a region. The 
function Shape maps an object onto its shape. 
For example, if D1 is an object, then given (Exl ), the sentence (Ex2) represents the 
fact that Dl’s shape is a circle with a radius five units. Similarly, if D2 is an object, the 
sentence (Ex3) represents that its shape is a circle of unknown radius. 
Shupe(D1) = Disc(S). @x2) 
3d [ Shupe( 02) = Disc(d) 1. @x3) 
Since the spatial properties we want to capture are fluent& that is to say they are 
subject o variation over time, they will be reified, so that they can appear as arguments 
to temporal predicates. A sort for fluents is introduced, with variables f, fa, ft , f2,. . . . 
A sort for situations is also introduced, with variables , so, sr , ~2,. . . . A situation is an 
instantaneous snapshot of the state of the world. The formula Holds( f, s) represents 
that fluent f is true in situation s. 
Now we can introduce fluents for describing an object’s location and the space it 
occupies. The fluent Occupies( ob, r) represents that ob uniquely occupies the region r. 
No object can occupy two regions at the same time. The meaning of this fluent is such 
that although an object occupies a region r, it does not occupy any subset of r. The 
region occupied by an object is, in this sense, maximal. We have the following axioms. 
Axiom (Spl ) says that an object can occupy at most one region, and Axiom (Sp2) 
says that no two objects can occupy overlapping regions. Axiom (Sp2) will have to be 
made more liberal for domains in which an object can be decomposed into parts which 
are themselves objects. 
[Holds(Occupies(ob, r-1 ), s) A Holds(Occupies(ob, r-2. s)] + rl = r2. (SPl) 
’ A disc is represented here by a closed set. It could equally well have been represented by an open set. The 
problem of defining when two objects can be said to touch is beyond the scope of this paper. 
* All variables are universally quantified unless otherwise shown. A suitable set of uniqueness-of-names 
axioms will be assumed. 
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[Holds(Occupies(obl,rl),s) A 
Holds( Occupies(ob2, T-Z), s) A obl # ob2] + 
73~ IP E rl AP E 121. (SP2) 
These axioms are examples of domain constraints. The presence of domain constraints 
like these will restrict our choice of solution to the frame problem. A further domain 
constraint is required to relate an object’s location to the region it occupies. The fluent 
Locution(ob, p) represents that ob occupies the region obtained by displacing the shape 
of ob by dl units horizontally and d2 units vertically, where p = (dl, d2). Recall that 
the conventional reference point of a shape is the point (0,O). So in effect, the fluent 
Location(ob,p) represents that ob is positioned with its centre at point p. 
Note that there is a difference between space which is actually occupied, and space 
which is simply used to describe a shape. Although there can be many shapes whose 
reference point is the origin (0, 0), only one object can actually occupy a region including 
the origin. The relationship between Location and Occupies is given by the following 
axiom. The function Displuce( r, p) denotes the region obtained by displacing the region 
r by dl units horizontally and d2 units vertically, where p = (dl , d2). 
Holds( Occupies(ob, t-1 ), s) +- 
Shupe( ob) = r-2 A Holds( Location(ob, p) , s) A rl = Dispiace( r2, p). (SP3) 
Notice that the fluent Locution only permits the description of translations of an object’s 
shape with respect to the origin. It does not enable us to describe rotations. However, 
because (Sp3) is an implication rather than a biconditional, it would be straightforward 
to extend the language to include other fluents for describing rotations in combination 
with translations. 
The basic vocabulary of a versatile language, which I will call Li, for describing the 
shape and spatial location of objects has now been presented. The features of Lt are 
summarised in Appendix A. The language is similar to that developed by Davis [4]. 
But before we could use it to represent and reason about complicated shapes, we would 
first have to formalise the commonsense law about spatial occupancy which is the main 
concern of this paper. In the next section, a simple move action is formalised, whose 
precondition that an object’s destination must be empty is an example of how the need 
for this law arises. In the succeeding sections, we will see how attempts to formalise 
this law interact with the existence of situations axiom required by Baker’s approach to 
the frame problem. 
3. Movement 
A full-scale theory of commonsense would have to incorporate a theory of continuous 
motion. Our everyday world is full of it-the movement of people, cars, animals, clouds, 
and so forth. The formalisation of discrete motion is only useful when studying abstrac- 
tions like the Blocks World. However, the Blocks World is valuable as a distillation of 
certain problems which arise in any formalisation of change, such as the frame problem 
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and the qualification problem. When we begin to scale up from the Blocks World, we 
encounter new problems. But these problems too can be most easily studied by looking 
at the smallest possible scaling up in which they are still manifest. 
The language of the preceding section moves beyond the usual representations of the 
Blocks World by considering space as a real-valued co-ordinate system, rather than a 
finite number of locations.3 The next step in a full-scale theory would be to formalise 
continuous motion. In [ 211, a variant of state-based minimisation is applied to the 
representation of continuous change. The work reported there, in combination with 
elements of the language Lt, could form the basis of such a formalisation. But this is 
not the concern of the present paper. Here we are interested in certain issues in default 
reasoning which arise when we consider spatial occupancy even in the discrete case. 
This section formalises discrete motion in the context of the language of Section 1, and 
draws attention to this spatial occupancy problem with an example. 
The familiar notation of the situation calculus will be adopted, and is assumed 
to be contained in the language Lt. This includes a sort for actions, with variables 
a,ao,al,a;?,. . . . The term ResuZt( a, s) denotes the situation which results from per- 
forming action a in situation s. The effects of an action are described by a number of 
axioms of motion. The domain we will study comprises the single action Move(ab,p), 
which, if successful, moves the reference point of the object to point p, That is to say, 
if the action is successful, the object will occupy the region by displacing the object’s 
shape by dt units horizontally and d2 units vertically, where p = (dl , dz). 
I will not consider the possibility of two Move actions taking place concurrently, 
although the work of Lin and Shoham [ 141 would be helpful in this respect. The Move 
action has a single precondition. The action Move( ob, p) will be successful if and only 
if the region around p to which ob is to be moved is empty. In practice, a more complex 
precondition than this would be required, one which insisted on a clear path to the 
object’s destination. But my concern here is only to illustrate the need to minimise 
spatial occupancy. We have the following axiom of motion. 
Holds(Lmation(ob,p), Result(Move(ob,p), s)) + 
Possible( Move( ob, p) , s) . (Dal) 
PossibZe( Move( obl , p1 ) , s) H 
Shape(obl) = rl A r2 = DispZace(rl ,pl) A 
Job2, r-3, p2 [ HoZds( Occupies( ob2, t-3 > , s) 
Aobl # ob2Ap2 E r2 Ap2 E 1-31. (Do2) 
Many techniques have been developed to address the frame problem, especially since 
Hanks and McDermott [ 71 introduced the Yale shooting scenario as a benchmark (see 
[ 12,231, for example). In this paper, the following general-purpose frame axiom (Chl) 
will be used in combination with the circumscription policy devised by Baker [2]. 
3 In fact, we do not have to move to a real-valued co-ordinate system for the issues under discussion in this 
paper to arise. Space does not even have to be dense, but simply has to comprise a very large number of 
possible locations. 
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Baker’s attempt to overcome the frame problem is one of the most successful, and is 
certainly the most appropriate here, since as well as dealing with the Hanks-McDermott 
problem, it can cope with domain constraints (or actions with ramifications). 
[Holds(f,s) +-+ Holds(f,Result(a,s))] + ~Ab(a, f,s>. (Chl) 
In addition to the frame axiom (Chl >, Baker’s approach to the frame problem employs 
an axiom which guarantees the existence of a situation for every possible combination 
of fluents in the domain. Axiom (St 1) below fulfills exactly the same role as Baker’s 
existence of situations axiom, but works in a slightly different way. Instead of employing 
Baker’s generalised fluents (compound fluents formed with the functions And and Neg), 
I will only consider interpretations in which the domain of the situation sort is the power 
set of all fluents. Obviously, any such interpretation will include a set for every possible 
combination of fluents, containing exactly those fluents. The only extra axiom that is 
required then is the following. 
[Holds( f, s) +-+ f E s] +- ~AbSrute( s). (St11 
The E predicate is now being used for both sets of fluents and sets of points. Axiom 
(St1 ) is made into a default by the AbState condition, as in Baker’s axiom. This makes 
it consistent for domain constraints to rule out certain combinations of fluents. The 
circumscription policy to overcome the frame problem, representing the commonsense 
law of inertia, is to minimise Ab and AbState, with the minimisation of AbStute taking 
a higher priority than that of Ab, allowing the Result function to vary. Letting the Result 
function vary means that two models can still be compared although they interpret the 
Result function differently. 
Now let’s consider an example. Suppose that we are interested in a world of discs, 
each of radius five units. There are two discs in the initial situation, D1 and D2, whose 
reference points are located respectively at (0,O) and (10,lO). What is the result of 
moving D1 to (20,20)? The initial situation, which is denoted by So, is described by 
the following sentences. 
Shupe( D1 ) = Disc( 5). 03x4) 
Shupe( 02) = Disc( 5). (Ex5) 
Holds(Location( D,, (O,O)), So). (Exe) 
Holds(fmution( D2, (10, lo)), So). @x7) 
Let S1 = Result(Move( D1, (20,20)), SO). Intuitively, from the axioms given so far, 
we might expect to be able to prove Holds( Location( D1, (20,20)), SI > . But it is easy 
to see that we cannot. In fact, we can’t prove anything useful about Dl’s location in 
Result(Move( Dl, (20,20)), SO), because we can neither prove nor disprove the pre- 
condition Possible(Move( D,, (20,20)), SO). And the reason we can neither prove nor 
disprove this precondition is that the sentences describing the initial condition (Ex4)- 
(Ex7) do not exclude the possibility that there are other objects besides D1 and D2, 
which could occupy regions overlapping with Dl’s destination. Some models will exist 
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which include such extra objects, and others will exist which do not. In the first kind of 
model, D1 will stay put because the frame axiom (Chl) will apply, and in the second 
kind D1 will move, because Axiom (Dol) will apply. 
4. The spatial occupancy problem 
The obvious solution to the spatial occupancy problem described at the end of the 
last section is to state explicitly which regions of space are not occupied in &. For the 
example here, this could be done with the following sentence, which says that the only 
objects occupying any space in Sa are D1 and D2. 
dab, r [Holds( Occupies(ob, r), So) A ob # DI A ob # 021. 
From (Ex8) and (Spl) it is straightforward toprove that the five-unit circle of space 
around (20,20) is empty in So. However, there are several reasons why we cannot expect 
always to be able to write a sentence like (Ex8). First, we have to worry about every 
situation, not just the initial one. But, as I will show later, an appropriate treatment of 
the problem for the initial situation may suffice for all situations. 
The second reason is that it may not be a straightforward matter to work out what 
objects are present in the initial situation. In the example here, they are given explicitly, 
but this may not be the case. Suppose we have compound objects. Given that a compound 
object is present in the initial situation, we might want to be able to deduce that all parts 
are also present. Conversely, given that all the parts of a compound object are present, 
we might want to be able to deduce that the whole object is there. Such examples are not 
considered in this paper, but whenever there is a complex logical relationship between 
the various objects that exist in the initial situation, it will in general not be possible to 
write a sentence like (Ex8) without first of all working out the logical consequences of
the other sentences describing the initial situation. 
A third reason is simply that any such sentence may turn out to be false. We don’t 
really want to pretend that we know all the objects that are present in the initial situation 
when we don’t, but rather to be able to assume by default that the objects we do know 
about are all there are. This admits the possibility that later information may lead us 
to reject our assumption. What we seek, in other words, is an “elaboration-tolerant” 
solution, 4 one which does not demand the reconstruction of our knowledge when 
new information arrives, but instead is able to gracefully absorb revisions to our old 
assumptions. 
Finally, facts about what space is empty seem so mundane that we feel that we 
shouldn’t have to write them out explicitly. They are a matter of commonsense. In
constructing a set of axioms to describe a situation, why should we be forced to concern 
ourselves with the obvious? In a domain of any complexity, the task will be hard enough 
as it is. 
In short, we want to use some form of default reasoning to assume that space is 
unoccupied by default, in much the same way and for much the same reasons that we 
4 This tern is due to McCarthy. 
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needed to employ default reasoning to overcome the frame problem by assuming that 
actions do not affect fluents by default.5 
The first option is to use some form of domain closure to minimise the objects in the 
domain. However, not every object in the domain of discourse is necessarily present (in 
the sense of being spatially located) in every situation, In principle, objects can come 
into being and can cease to exist. For example, the outcome of cutting a loaf of bread 
into slices is that the loaf ceases to exist and the individual slices come into being (see 
[6] ). Appendix B suggests how the language of this paper can be used to formalise 
such examples. Domain closure is too weak to be useful here, because it would not 
prohibit models in which the loaf reappears as a separate entity to block a later Move 
action. 
The minimisation required must be relativised to each situation. This is why domain 
closure is too coarse to be effective. In effect, we need to pick a fluent to minimise 
in each situation. This can be done using circumscription in the usual way through an 
abnormality predicate. The question is which fluent to pick. The two possibilities are 
Occupies and Location. 
If we choose Location, then we need to introduce an extra axiom which insists 
that if an object occupies a region, then it must also have a location. Otherwise 
models will be permitted in which a phantom object, which occupies space but has 
no location, blocks a Move action. That is to say, we could have an object A such 
that Holds( Occupies(A, r), s), for some r and s, but where there is no p such that 
Holds(L.ocation( A,p), s). With the introduction of an axiom setting up a one-one 
mapping between Occupies and Location, it is easy to prove that minimising Location 
and minimising Occupies would be equivalent. 
So let’s choose to minim&e Occupies. Note that this is not an attempt to select 
models with fewer objects in their domains. Rather, the circumscription, along with all 
the circumscriptions in the rest of the paper, is an attempt to prefer models in which 
fewer objects are located in space. The following axiom, plus a circumscription policy 
that minimises AbSpace, seems as if it should do the job. 
AbSpace( r, s) +- Job Holds( Occupies( ob, r) , s) . (Ocl) 
However, in the presence of Axiom (St1 ) , since a situation exists for every possible 
combination of fluents, minimising AbSpace in fact has no effect whatsoever. A circum- 
scription policy which minimises AbSpace prefers models with situations in which there 
is less spatial occupancy. But every model includes all possible situations anyway, with 
every possible degree of spatial occupancy, so to prefer models with a certain kind of 
situation is simply to have no preference. 
To see this, consider (Ex4)-(Ex7) again, and suppose mat we also have (Ocl), and 
that we circumscribe minimising AbSpace. Axioms (Ex6) and (Ex7) tell us that in 
situation So, there are two discs. There is nothing to say that they are the only discs, 
but the intention was that the circumscription should rule out models with extra objects. 
5 I suspect that the spatial occupancy problem described here, like the frame problem, will arise with any 
formalism for representing change. There is no reason that it is a consequence of choosing the situation 
calculus. 
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However, we must not forget Axiom (Stl), which has the same effect as Baker’s 
existence of situations axiom, and which is there to ensure that we can overcome the 
frame problem. 
Axiom (Stl) guarantees that every model includes a situation for every legitimate 
combination of fluents (illegitimate combinations being ruled out by domain con- 
straints). This means that every model includes situations with one disc, with two 
discs, with three discs, and so on, in every possible location. In general, every model 
includes a situation for every possible arrangement of shapes and objects. The effect of 
Axioms (Ex4)-(Ex7) is simply to ensure that in each model, So denotes a situation in 
which there are two discs in the appropriate locations. 
Now, the circumscription policy prefers models in which there is less spatial occu- 
pancy. In other words, it would prefer a model which included only situations with discs 
Di and D2, to a model which included those situations plus some situations with an 
extra, phantom disc. But the first kind of model does not exist. Even though only a 
fraction of them play any role, every model has to include every possible situation. So 
the circumscription policy doesn’t achieve anything at all. 
One way out of this would seem to be to minimise AbSpace with a higher priority than 
AbStute. Then the circumscription would indeed prefer models with situations with less 
spatial occupance. Unfortunately though, this would be at the expense of our solution 
to the frame problem. 
To see this, consider the same example again, but suppose we are minimising AbSpace. 
AbStute and Ab prioritised in that order. Now models which include situations with 
phantom extra discs are ruled out, because they will never be minimal with respect o 
AbSpuce, which has the highest priority in the circumscription. But because AbSpuce 
has the highest priority, the circumscription ow prefers models in which spontaneous 
acts of destruction take place. For example, in models in which a Move action destroys 
all discs apart from the one it is moving, the extension of Ab will be larger than in some 
other models, but this is set against a reduction in the extension of AbSpuce, which 
takes priority. 
5. Default reasoning and the existence of situations 
A better approach to the spatial occupancy problem than that offered by Axiom (Ocl ) 
is to distinguish certain situations as the “important” ones, without eliminating the rest 
from any model, and to minimise spatial occupancy with respect o the important situa- 
tions only. To see how this might work, consider the following axiom which substitutes 
for (0~1). 
AbSpuce( r, s) +- Zmportunr( s) A 3ob Holds( Occupies( ob, I), s) . (Oc2) 
Of course, if the same combinations of fluents were the important ones in every 
model, this manoeuvre wouldn’t succeed. But it does succeed, because the name of a 
situation can be used to identify it as an important one, and the same names can refer 
to different combinations of fluents in different models. However, the result of applying 
this strategy isn’t always obvious. For example, to identify as important only those 
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situations which are the result of applying a sequence of actions to the initial situation, 
it seems that we should be able to use the following sentences. 
Importunt( sI ) c--) Initial( s1 ) v [ sI = Result( a, s2) A Zmportunt( s2) 1. (Oc3) 
InitiuZ( s, ) A Initiul( s2) + S] = s2. Unl) 
Axiom (Inl) ensures that there is a unique initial situation. Axiom (Oc3) picks 
out a subset of the possible combinations of fluents, namely those that are accessible 
from the initial situation. But contrary to what we might expect, the minimisation of 
AbSpuce in the presence of (0~2)~ (0~3) and (In1 ) has no effect on any situation 
except the initial one. Intuitively, this is because the minimisation of Ab to solve the 
frame problem already takes care of minimising spatial occupancy, so long as spatial 
occupancy is minimised in the initial situation. If there is no unnecessary occupation of 
space in the initial situation, then any solution to the frame problem should ensure that 
no objects are spontaneously created (or destroyed) by any action, since that would 
constitute an unnecessary abnormality. This leads us to a more elegant solution of the 
spatial occupancy problem, which is simply to minimise spatial occupancy in the initial 
situation, using the following axiom instead of (0~3). 
AbSpuce( r) +- 306 Holds( Occupies( ob, r) , SO). (Oc4) 
The circumscription policy is to minimise AbStute, Ab, and AbSpuce, prioritised in 
that order, allowing all other predicates and functions to vary. This is still just a partial 
solution, however, since it only works for problems in which the only given information 
concerns the initial situation. If we have information about the locations of objects in 
situations other than the initial one, the minimisation of spatial occupancy will go awry. 
A fuller solution is presented at the end of this section. But first, I want to take a 
step back, in order to clarify this approach of distinguishing certain situations from the 
rest, and restricting the minimisation of spatial occupancy to those alone. Otherwise, it 
may seem that the solutions I am proposing are an artefact of Baker’s approach to the 
frame problem, and that in the context of a different approach to the frame problem, a 
solution to the spatial occupancy problem would be possible which didn’t require certain 
situations to be distinguished from the rest. 
The ontology of the situation calculus is free of any commitment to the actual occur- 
rence of any particular sequence of actions and is neutral about whether any particular 
state of affairs actually comes about. Every model of a collection of sentences describing 
the effects of actions potentially includes every possible sequence of actions, and every 
possible state of affairs. In the context of such models, it makes no sense to speak 
of preferring those which have situations with less spatial occupancy, because every 
model potentially contains every possible situation, with every possible degree of spatial 
occupancy. 
But the assumption behind the idea of minimising spatial occupancy is that we have 
incomplete knowledge about certain situations. A better way of putting it is to say that we 
don’t know which combinations of fluents certain situation names refer to. Then, what 
minimising spatial occupancy really does is to prefer models in which those situation 
names refer to combinations of fluents with less spatial occupancy. The same collections 




of fluents appear in every model, but the particular collection of fluents denoted by a 
given name can vary. This is what we are really doing when we distinguish certain 
situations from the rest and confine minimisation to those situations. The situations we 
distinguish are those of which we can give only a partial description, which we do by 
referring to the situation by a name. 
To make this clearer, let’s consider a simple and slightly informal example which 
embodies ome of the same problems we have encountered with the formal treatment 
of spatial occupancy. Suppose we have a language of sorted predicate calculus which 
includes sets and set membership. Let’s consider only interpretations in which sets and 
set membership are interpreted in the usual way. Now suppose we have the following 
sentences. 
Speck& Si ) A Special( S2) A Special( S3). (Ex9) 
bES1 AbESzAbES3AcES3. (ExlO) 
What we want to do is minimise membership of the special sets Si, S2 and Ss. Note 
that 4, S2 and S3 can denote the same object. The natural way to do this would seem 
to be to circumscribe these sentences along with the following sentence, minimising Ab 
and allowing Special, SI, S2, and S3 to vary. 
Ab(s, f) +- Special(s) A f E s. (Exll) 
But consider the two models illustrated in Fig. 1. It can easily be verified that both 
A41 and h42 are models of the circumscription. Yet in Ml, & denotes a proper subset 
of the set it denotes in A42. Otherwise, the models are identical. The circumscription 
has failed to capture what we wanted, which was to prefer interpretations in which the 
names Si, S2 and S3 each denote the smallest possible sets. 
Now consider instead the two sets Al?] = {(t,f) ) MI satisfies Ab(t,f)} and AB2 = 
{(r,f) 1 M2 satisfies Ab(t,f)}, where t is one of the terms Si, S2 or Ss. From Fig. 1, 
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In other words, ABI c AB2. So the subset relation between sets defined in this way 
seems to capture the preference relation between models we were seeking, where the 
obvious circumscription policy failed. 
I won’t make any strong claims about this kind of preference relation here, except 
that it captures a certain sort of minimisation which is hard to describe using ordinary 
circumscription. The minimisation of spatial occupancy, like that of set membership 
here, is an example of this. As in this example, the minimisation we seek for spatial 
occupancy is relative to the names of things rather than the things those names denote. 
Let’s return to Axiom (0~4). In principle, we could name and partially describe a 
whole narrative of situations and actions (see [ 171). But the solution represented by 
(0~4) fails where there is spatial occupancy information about situations other than 
the initial one. Axiom (0~5) below represents a more complete solution to the spatial 
occupancy problem, but it also incorporates an innovation to the situation calculus, 
namely the idea of narrative time [ 171. 6 An extra sort for times is introduced, with 
variables t, to, tl , t2,. . . . For any given time t, there is a unique situation, corresponding 
to the set of fluents that hold in that situation, and denoted by the term St@ t). The 
language we obtain by incorporating these innovations into Lt will be denoted L2 (see 
Appendix A). 
AbSpace( r, t) +-- 3ob Holds( Occupies( ob, r) , State(t) ) . (Oc5) 
As before, we minimise AbState, Ab and AbSpace, prioritised in that order, allowing 
all other predicates and functions to vary. The effect of (0~5) with this circumscription 
policy is to ensure that, for any time t, the situation denoted by State(t) has the least 
possible spatial occupancy. As with the solution using (OCR), Baker’s solution to the 
frame problem ensures that the result of any sequence of actions applied to a situation 
denoted by the State function also has the least possible spatial occupancy. 
6. Separating the spatial and temporal defaults 
The following results demonstrate that the minimisation of spatial occupancy ac- 
cording to the policy described above does not interfere with the minimisation of the 
effects of actions. These results are important because they show that Baker’s solution 
to the frame problem is still a solution, even though an extra kind of minimisation is 
being introduced. One of the lessons of the Hanks-McDermott problem [7] was that 
circumscription can be sensitive to apparently small changes to the formula being cir- 
cumscribed. Circumscription needs to be used in ways that can be shown to be more 
robust. 
Let CIRC[ 4; P*] denote the circumscription of 4 minimising P* and allowing all 
other predicates and functions to vary, where P’ is a set of predicates. Let CZRC[ 4; P;” > 
. > Pf ] denote the circumscription of 4 minimising P; to P,*, prioritised in that 
order, and allowing all other predicates and functions to vary, where P; to P,* are 
sets of predicates. Let CIRC[ 4; P; > > P,*; Q*] denote the circumscription of 4 
’ A similar step is taken, for similar reasons, by Crawford and Etherington 131, 
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minimising P; to P,*, prioritised in that order, and allowing Q* to vary, where P; to 
P,* are sets of predicates and Q* is a set of predicates, functions and constants. The 
following theorem is due to Lifschitz [ 111. 
Theorem 1. If P; to P,* are sets of predicates ana’ Q* is a set of predicates, functions 
and constants, then CIRC[ 4; P; > . . . > P,*; Q*] is equivalent to 
CZRC[ 4; P; > . . . > P,*_,;Pn’uQ*] ACZRC[I$;P;;Q*]. 
Let CIRCs [ q!~] denote the circumscription of 4 minimising AbState, Ab, and AbSpace, 
prioritised in that order, and allowing all other predicates, 50 and the Result function to 
vary* 
Theorem 2. Zf do is a formula of LI which does not mention the predicate AbSpace, 
then CZRCs[ dr A (Ck4) ] is equivalent to 
CIRC[ 4; AbState > Ab] A CIRC[ 4 A (Ck4) ; AbSpace] . 
In other words, for simple projection problems, the minimisation of AbSpace does not 
interfere with the commonsense law of inertia, and vice versa. 
Proof. It follows from Theorem 1 that CZRCs [c$ A (0~4) ] is equivalent to CZRC[ do A 
(0~4) ; AbState > Ab] A CZRC[ do A (0~4) ; AbSpace] . Consider the first of these con- 
juncts. Because of the form of (OCR), and because it is the only predicate to men- 
tion AbSpace, CZRC[ 4 A (0~4); AbState > Ab] is equivalent o CZRC[ 4; AbState > 
Ab] A (0~4). So we have CZRCs[ 4 A (OCR)] is equivalent o CZRC[ 4; AbState > 
Ab] A (0~4) ACZRC[ c$A (Ck4) ; AbSpace] , from which the theorem follows directly. 0 
Finally, we have a version of Theorem 2 for Axiom (0~5). 
Theorem 3. Zf r#~ is a formula of L2 which does not mention the predicate AbSpace, 
then CZRCs[ do A (Ck5) ] is equivalent to 
CZRC[ 4; AbState > Ab] A CZRC[ 4 A (0~5); AbSpace] . 
Proof. The proof is the same, mutatis mutandis, as for Theorem 2. 0 
Note that, following the methodological recommendations of Lifschitz [ 131 and 
Sandewall [20], Theorems 2 and 3 apply to a wide class of theories, namely those 
describable by the languages L1 and L2, respectively. 
7. The example revisited 
Now let’s reconsider the example given at the end of Section 2. Let 4 be the conjunc- 
tion of (Spl)-(Sp3), (Dal)-(Do2), (Chl), (Stl) and (Ex4)-(Ex7). We’ll consider 
the use of (0~4) first, Let 
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s, = Result(Move( D, ) (20,20)), So). 
Does HoZds(Locution( Di , (20,20)), Sr ) now follow from CZRCs [ c$ A (0~4) ] ? 
From (Ex4)-(Ex7) and (Sp3), we have, 
3ri, Y:! [ Hulds( Occupies( D1 , r-1) , SO) A Holds( Occupies( D2, r2), SO) 1. 
From Theorem 2, we have CZRC[ 4 A (0~4) ; AbSpace] . So, minimising spatial occu- 
pancy in SO, we have, 
4ob, r [Holds( Occupies(ob, r), SO) A ob # D, A ob # Dz] 
from which it’s easy to show, 
Possible(Move( D1, (20,20)), SO). 
Then Holds(Location( D1, (20,20)), SI ) follows from CZRC[ 4; AbStute < Ab], 
which itself follows from Theorem 2. 
Using Axiom (OCR), the example has to be represented slightly differently. Instead 
of (Ex6) and (Ex~), we have, 
Holds(Locution( D1 , (0, 0)) , Stute( 0) ) (Ex12) 
Holds(Locution(D2, (10, lO)),Stute(O)). (Ex13) 
Now let 4 be the conjunction of Axioms (Spl)-(Sp3), (Dol), (DON), 
(Chl), (Stl), (Ex~), (Ex~), (Ex12). and (Ex13). We want to show that 
Holds(Locution( D1, (20,20)), SI ) follows from CZRCs [ qb A (0~5) 1, where this time 
Sf = Result(Muve( D1, (20,20)), State(O) ). The derivation is then the same, mututis 
mutundis, as above. 
8. Concluding remarks 
The need to formalise the default rule that space is normally empty has drawn 
attention to the need for care when combining defaults. In solving the frame problem, one 
approach is to employ an existence of situations axiom to ensure the correct formalisation 
of the default rule that actions normally leave fluents unchanged. However, the presence 
of this axiom rules out some apparently intuitive ways of formalising the required default 
about spatial occupancy. 
Does this mean that the existence of situations axiom is, in some sense, wrong? 
After all, if it is a reasonable axiom, we shouldn’t expect its presence to give rise to 
counter-intuitive results, whatever new defaults we add. The difficulty here arises from 
ambiguity about what exactly a situation is. We must be clear whether a situation is 
a hypothetical snapshot of the world (in which case there will be a unique situation 
for every time but not the other way around), or whether it is a snapshot of an actual 
narrative of events (in which case there will be a unique time for every situation but 
not the other way around). 
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McCarthy’s original conception of the situation calculus is compatible with either 
interpretation.7 But the existence of situations axiom seems to imply the first interpre- 
tation. On the other hand, the incomplete information about spatial occupancy which has 
been the focus of this paper is an example of incomplete information about situations 
along an actual narrative, which seems to imply the second interpretation. One way 
around this apparent impasse is to accept he first interpretation, and to relativise default 
reasoning about spatial occupancy, not to situations, but to the names of situations (the 
paper’s first solution) or to times (the paper’s second solution). 
The same strategy could be used in the context of other sorts of incompleteness in
the description of a narrative besides spatial occupancy. The more general problem of 
narratives in the situation calculus has recently been studied by a number of authors 
(Crawford and Etherington [ 31, Pinto and Reiter [ 181, Miller and Shanahan [17]), 
and their techniques could contribute to a more refined solution to the spatial occupancy 
problem. This is the subject of ongoing work. 
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Appendix A. The languages L1 and LZ 
The language L1 is a many-sorted subset of first-order predicate calculus with equality. 
It includes all the usual connectives and quantifiers, and well-formed formulae of L1 
are constructed in the standard way, except that the functions, constants and predicates 
of Lr are constrained as follows. L1 contains variables for regions (r, ra, ri, r-2, . . .), 
points (P~PO,PI,P~, . . .), distances (d,da,di,d:!, . . .), objects (ob,oba,obi,ob~, . . .), 
fbents (f~f0.f1,f2,. . .), situations (s, so, si , ~2, . . .), and actions (a, u,-J, al, ~2, . . .). 
These are the only sorts in Lr . 
~51 includes the following functions: Shape from objects to regions, Occupies from 
objects and regions to fluents, Locution from objects and points to fluents, Displace 
from regions and points to regions, and Result from actions and situations to situations. 
L1 also includes a function which maps pairs of reals x and y to points, written (x, y). 
L1 contains the situation constant SO, and constants for (a subset of) the reals written 
using the standard ecimal notation. Besides the above, a well-formed formula of LI 
may mention other functions and constants of any sort except situations. 
Lr also includes the infix predicates E, <, <, >, and 2, as well as the following 
predicates: Holds which takes as arguments a fluent and a situation, Possible which takes 
an action and a situation, AbStute which takes a situation, Ab which takes an action, a 
fluent and a situation, and AbSpuce which takes a region. These are the only predicates 
in LI. 
7 This was confirmed by McCarthy in conversation. 
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Before Cut(ob) After Cut(ob) 
Fig. B.1 
The language L2 is simply L1 augmented with a sort for times (t, to, tl ,t2,. . .) and 
a function State from times to situations, but without the situation constant SO. In L2, 
the predicate AbSpace takes as arguments a region and a time. 
Appendix B. Cutting an object in half 
The following formulae (Ex 14) -( Ex 17) illustrate how the languages L1 and L2 might 
be used to formalise domains in which objects come into being and cease to exist. The 
action Cut(ob), when applied to a disc of radius d, destroys ob and replaces it by two 
objects 7’op( ob) and Bot( ob) , whose shapes are slightly truncated semi-circles as shown 
in Fig. B.l. The conventional centre of both Top(ob) and Bot(ob) is the centre of the 
disc ob, although (0,O) is not contained in either shape. 
[ Holds(Location( Top( ob) , p) , Result( Cut( ob) , s) ) A 
Hold.s(Location(Bot( ob) , p) , Result( Cut( ob) , s) ) ] t 
[ Holds(L.mation( ob, p) , s) A Shape( ob) = Disc(d) 1. (Ex14) 
73~ [Holds(Location( ob, p) , Result (Cut( ob) , s) > ] t 
Shape( ob) = Disc(d) . 
(x,Y) E Shape(Top(ob)) ++ 
(Ex15) 
[Shape(ob) =Disc(d) ADistance((x,y), (0,O)) < d Ay 2 d/100]. 
(x, y) E Shape(Bot(ob) ) ++ 
(Ex16) 
[Shape(ob) =Disc(d) ADistance((x,y), (0,O)) < d Ay > -d/100]. (Ex17) 
The possibility of domains like this precludes the use of simple domain closure to 
solve the spatial occupancy problem, as argued in Section 3, since different objects exist 
(in the sense of being located) in different situations. 
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